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Abstract
Semi-quantum protocols that allow some of the users to remain classical are proposed for a large
class of problems associated with secure communication and secure multiparty computation. Specif-
ically, first time semi-quantum protocols are proposed for key agreement, controlled deterministic
secure communication and dialogue, and it is shown that the semi-quantum protocols for controlled
deterministic secure communication and dialogue can be reduced to semi-quantum protocols for e-
commerce and private comparison (socialist millionaire problem), respectively. Complementing with
the earlier proposed semi-quantum schemes for key distribution, secret sharing and deterministic
secure communication, set of schemes proposed here and subsequent discussions have established
that almost every secure communication and computation tasks that can be performed using fully
quantum protocols can also be performed in semi-quantum manner. Further, it addresses a funda-
mental question in context of a large number problems- how much quantumness is (how many quan-
tum parties are) required to perform a specific secure communication task? Some of the proposed
schemes are completely orthogonal-state-based, and thus, fundamentally different from the existing
semi-quantum schemes that are conjugate-coding-based. Security, efficiency and applicability of the
proposed schemes have been discussed with appropriate importance.
Keywords: Semi-quantum protocol, quantum communication, key agreement, quantum dialogue, deter-
ministic secure quantum communication, secure direct quantum communication.
1 Introduction
Since Bennett and Brassard’s pioneering proposal of unconditionally secure quantum key distribution
(QKD) scheme based on conjugate coding [1], various facets of secure communication have been ex-
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plored using quantum resources. On the one hand, a large number of conjugate-coding-based (BB84-
type) schemes [2–4] have been proposed for various tasks including QKD [2–4], quantum key agreement
(QKA) [5], quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) [6,7], deterministic secure quantum commu-
nication (DSQC) [8, 9], quantum e-commerce [10], quantum dialogue [11–30], etc., on the other hand,
serious attempts have been made to answer two extremely important foundational questions- (1) Is con-
jugate coding necessary for secure quantum communication? (2) How much quantumness is needed for
achieving unconditional security? Alternatively, whether all the users involved in a secure communica-
tion scheme are required to be quantum in the sense of their capacity to perform quantum measurement,
prepare quantum states in more than one mutually unbiased basis (MUBs) and/or the ability to store
quantum information? Efforts to answer the first question have led to a set of orthogonal-state-based
schemes [5, 31–34], where security is obtained without using our inability to simultaneously measure a
quantum state using two or more MUBs. These orthogonal-state-based schemes [5,31–34] have strongly
established that any cryptographic task that can be performed using a conjugate-coding-based scheme
can also be performed using an orthogonal-state-based scheme. Similarly, efforts to answer the second
question have led to a few semi-quantum schemes for secure communication which use lesser amount
of quantum resources than that required by their fully quantum counterparts (protocols for same task
with all the participants having power to use quantum resources). Protocols for a variety of quantum
communication tasks have been proposed under the semi-quantum regime; for example, semi-quantum
key distribution (SQKD) [35–49], semi-quantum information splitting (SQIS) [50], semi-quantum secret
sharing (SQSS) [51–53], semi-quantum secure direct communication (SQSDC) [54, 55], semi-quantum
private comparison [34,56], authenticated semi-quantum direct communication [54] have been proposed.
The majority of these semi-quantum schemes are two-party schemes, but a set of multi-party schemes
involving more than one classical Bob have also been proposed [42]. In some of these multi-party semi-
quantum schemes (especially, for multiparty SQKD) it has been assumed that there exist a completely
untrusted server/center Charlie who, is a quantum user and either all [41] or some [39] of the other users
are classical. Further, some serious attempts have been made for providing security proof for semi-
quantum protocols [57–62]. However, to the best of our knowledge until now no semi-quantum protocol
has been proposed for a set of cryptographic tasks, e.g., (i) semi-quantum key agreement (SQKA), (ii)
controlled deterministic secure semi-quantum communication (CDSSQC), (iii) semi-quantum dialogue
(SQD). These tasks are extremely important for their own merit as well as for the fact that a scheme
of CDSSQC can be easily reduced to a scheme of semi-quantum e-commerce in analogy with Ref. [63],
where it is shown that a controlled-DSQC scheme can be used for designing a scheme for quantum online
shopping. Further, a scheme for online shopping will be of much more practical relevance if end users
(especially buyers) do not require quantum resources and consequently can be considered as classical
users. In brief, a semi-quantum scheme for e-commerce is expected to be of much use. It is also known
that a Ba An type scheme for QD [11, 16] can be reduced to a scheme of QPC [16, 34] and then the
same can be used to solve socialist millionaire problem [16]; a scheme of QKA can be generalized to
multiparty case and used to provide semi-quantum schemes for sealed bid auction [64]; and in a similar
manner, a CDSSQC scheme can be used to yield a scheme for semi-quantum binary quantum voting in
analogy with [65, 66]. The fact that no semi-quantum scheme exists for SQD, SQKA and CDSSQC and
their wide applicability to e-commerce, voting, private comparison and other cryptographic tasks have
motivated us to design new protocols for SQD, SQKA and CDSSQC and to critically analyze their se-
curity and efficiency. To do so, we have designed 2 new protocols for CDSSQC and one protocol each
for SQD and SQKA. These new protocols provide some kind of completeness to the set of available
semi-quantum schemes and allows us to safely say that any secure communication task that can be per-
formed using full quantum scheme can also be performed with a semi-quantum scheme. Such reduction
of quantum resources is extremely important as quantum resources are costly and it is not expected that
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all the end users would possess quantum devices.
Before we proceed further, it would be apt to note that in the existing semi-quantum schemes dif-
ferent powers have been attributed to the classical party (lets call him as Bob for the convenience of the
discussion, but in practice we often name a classical user as Alice, too). Traditionally, it is assumed that
a classical Bob does not have a quantum memory and he can only perform a restricted set of classical
operations over a quantum channel. Specifically, Bob can prepare new qubits only in the classical basis
(i.e., in Z basis or {|0〉, |1〉} basis). In other words, he is not allowed to prepare |±〉 or other quantum
states that can be viewed as superposition of |0〉 and |1〉 states. On receipt of a qubit Bob can either
resend (reflect) the qubit (independent of the basis used to prepare the initial state) without causing any
disturbance or measure it only in the classical basis. He can also reorder the sequence of qubits received
by him by sending the qubits through different delay lines. In fact, first ever semi-quantum scheme for
key distribution was proposed by Boyer et al., in 2007 [35]. In this pioneering work, the user with re-
stricted power was referred to as classical Bob and in that work and in most of the subsequent works
( [37, 40, 41, 54] and references therein) it was assumed that Bob has access to a segment of the quantum
channel starting from Alice’s lab going back to her lab via Bob’s lab; as before, the classical party Bob
can either leave the qubit passing through the channel undisturbed or perform measurement in the com-
putational basis, which can be followed by fresh preparation of qubit in the computational basis. This
was followed by a semi-quantum scheme of key distribution [36], where the classical party can either
choose not to disturb the qubit or to measure it in the computational basis, and instead of preparing the
fresh qubits in the computational basis he may reorder the undisturbed qubits to ensure unconditional se-
curity. Later, these schemes were modified to a set of SQKD schemes with less than four quantum states,
where Alice requires quantum registers in some of the protocols [37], but does not require it in all the
protocols. In what follows, we attribute the same power to Bob in the schemes proposed in this paper. In
the schemes proposed below, senders are always classical and they are referred to as classical Bob/Alice.
This is in consistency with the nomenclature used in most of the recent works ( [35–37, 40, 41, 54] and
references therein). However, in the literature several other restrictions have been put on classical Bob.
For example, in Ref. [43] a SQKD scheme was proposed where Bob was not allowed to perform any
measurement and he was referred to as “limited classical Bob”. It was argued that a limited classical Bob
can circumvent some attacks related to the measurement device [67–69]. However, the scheme proposed
in [43] was not measurement device independent. Similarly, in [39] a server was delegated the task of
performing measurement and application of one of the two Pauli operations, while the classical users role
was restricted in randomly sending the received qubits to the server for random application of operator
or measurement. Such a classical user was referred to as “nearly classical Bob”.
Remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, a protocol for SQKA among a
quantum and a classical user is proposed. Two CDSSQC schemes with a classical sender and a receiver
and controller both possessing quantum powers are proposed in Sec. 3. In Sec. 4, a SQD scheme
between a classical and a quantum parties are designed. The security of the proposed schemes against
various possible attacks are discussed in the respective sections. The qubit efficiency of the proposed
schemes has been calculated in Sec. 5 before concluding the work in Sec. 6.
2 Protocol for semi-quantum key agreement
In analogy of the weaker notion of quantum key agreement, i.e., both the parties take part in preparation
of the final shared key, most of the SQKD protocols may be categorized as SQKA schemes. Here, we
rather focus on the stronger notion of the key agreement, which corresponds to the schemes where each
party contribute equally to the final shared key, and none of the parties can manipulate or know the final
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key prior to the remaining parties (for detail see [5] and references therein). We will also show that the
proposed SQKA scheme can be reduced to a scheme for SQKD, first of its own kind, in which a sender
can send a quantum key to the receiver in an unconditionally secure and deterministic manner.
In this section, we propose a two-party semi-quantum key agreement protocol, where Alice has all
quantum powers, but Bob is classical, i.e., he is restricted to perform the following operations (1) measure
and prepare the qubits only in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} (also called classical basis), and (2)
simply reflects the qubits without disturbance. The working of the proposed protocol is illustrated through
a schematic diagram shown in Fig. 1.
Step 1.1
Step 1.2
Step 1.4 -1.5
Alice
Alice
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Bob
Bob
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Figure 1: (Color online) Schematic diagram illustrating the working of protocol for SQKA proposed
here. The protocol is illustrated through three steps and is explained through Step1.1-Step1.5.
The following are the main steps in the protocol.
Protocol 1
Step1.1: Preparation of the quantum channel: Alice prepares n+m = N number of Bell states, i.e.,
|ψ+〉⊗N , where |ψ+〉 = |00〉+|11〉√
2
. Out of the total N Bell states, n will be used for key generation
while the remainingm will be used as decoy qubits for eavesdropping checking. Subsequently, she
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prepares two ordered sequences of all the first qubits and all the second qubits from the initial Bell
states. She keeps the first sequence with herself as home qubits (H) and sends the second sequence
to Bob as travel qubits (T) as shown by arrow in Step1.1 of Fig. 1. Using a quantum random number
generator (QRNG), Alice also prepares her raw key of n bits KA = {K1A, K2A · · ·KiA · · ·KnA},
where KiA is the i
th bit of KA, and KiA ∈ {0, 1} as shown in Step1.1 of Fig. 1.
Step1.2: Bob’s encoding: Bob also prepares his raw key KB = {K1B, K2B, · · · , KiB, · · · , KnB} of n bits
by using a RNG1, (which is independent of Alice’s QRNG), where KiB is the i
th bit of the KB
with KiB ∈ {0, 1}. After receiving all the qubits from Alice, Bob randomly chooses one of the two
operations, either to measure or reflect as shown in Step1.1 of Fig. 1. Specifically, he measures n
qubits (chosen randomly) in the computational basis, while reflects the remaining m qubits to be
used later for eavesdropping checking.
He forms a string of his measurement outcomes as rB = {r1B, r2B, · · · , riB, · · · , rnB}, where riB is the
measurement outcome of ith qubit chosen to be measured by Bob in the computational basis, and
therefore, riB ∈ {0, 1}. Then to encode his raw key KB, he performs a bit wise XOR operation,
i.e., rB ⊕KB and prepares corresponding qubits in the computational basis. Finally, he inserts the
encoded n qubits back into the string of reflectedm qubits and sends the resultant sequence rb back
to Alice only after applying a permutation operator ΠN as shown by the first arrow in Step1.2 of
Fig. 1. These qubits would further be used to make the final shared key Kf .
Step1.3: Announcements and eavesdropping checking: After receiving an authenticated acknowl-
edgment of the receipt of all the qubits from Alice, Bob announces the permutation operator Πm
corresponding to the qubits reflected by him. Though, this would reveal which qubits have been
measured and which qubits have been reflected by Bob but Eve or Alice cannot gain any advantage
due to lack of information regarding the permutation operator Πn. Further, to detect eavesdrop-
ping, Alice firstly measures the reflected qubits in Bell basis by combining them with respective
partner home qubits. If she finds the measurement result as |ψ+〉 state then they confirm that no
eavesdropping has happened, because the initial state was prepared in |ψ+〉 state, and they move
on to the next step, otherwise they discard the protocol and start from the beginning.
Step1.4: Extraction of the final shared key Kf by Bob: After ensuring that there is no eavesdropping,
Alice announces her secret key KA publicly as shown by the first arrow in Step1.4 of Fig. 1,
and Bob uses that information to prepare his final shared key Kf = KA ⊕ KB as he knows KB.
Subsequently, he also reveals the the permutation operator Πn.
Here, it is important to note that Alice announces her secret key KA only after the receipt of all the
encoded qubits from Bob. So, now Bob can not make any further changes as per his wish.
Step1.5: Extraction of the final shared key Kf by Alice: Once Alice has reordered Bob’s encoded
qubits she measures both the home (H) and travel (T) qubits in the computational basis. She
obtains a string of n bits rA corresponding to measurement outcomes of home qubits, and she can
1Bob being classical, we refer to his random number generator as a traditional pseudo random number generator, instead
of a true random number generator which is required to be quantum. This aspect of random key generation in Bob’s side is
not explicitly discussed in the existing works on semi-quantum protocols. However, it’s not a serious issue as on one hand,
extremely good quality pseudo random numbers can be generated classically (thus, use of a classical RNG will be sufficient
for the present purpose); on the other hand, QRNG are now commercially available and is not considered as a costly quantum
resource, so if one just allows an otherwise classical user to have an QRNG, the modified scheme could still be considered
as a semi-quantum scheme as Bob would still lack the power of performing quantum measurement and or storing quantum
information. In fact, measurement in classical basis would be sufficient for generation of true random number if Bob can
create a |±〉 state using a beam splitter.
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use the measurement outcomes of the travel qubits to know Bob’s encoded raw key as the initial
Bell states are publicly known. For the specific choice of initial Bell state here, i.e., |ψ+〉, the
relation rA = rB holds. Therefore, the final shared key would be
Kf = KA ⊕KB = (rA ⊕KA)⊕ (rB ⊕KB). (1)
Hence, the final shared key Kf is shared between Alice and Bob.
Alice’s
measurement result
rA on home (H)
qubits
Bob’s measurement
result rB
Bob’s secret key
KB
Alice’s
measurement result
on travel (T) qubits
|0〉 |0〉 |0〉 |0〉
|1〉 |1〉
|1〉 |1〉 |0〉 |1〉
|1〉 |0〉
Table 1: All the possibilities during Alice’s extraction of Bob’s secret key.
In Eq. (1), Eve may know Alice’s secret key KA as this was announced through a classical channel.
She is also aware of rA = rB due to public knowledge of the initial choice of Bell state. However, it does
not affect the secrecy of the final shared key Kf which is prepared as KA ⊕ KB, because Eve does not
know anything about Bob’s secret key KB and the value of rA (or rB).
Further, it should be noted here the computational basis measurement is not the only choice by Al-
ice, rather she can extract Bob’s encoding by performing Bell measurement. Here, we will skip that
discussion as the same has been discussed in the following section for semi-quantum dialogue protocol.
If we assume that Alice is not intended to send her raw key (i.e., she does not announce her raw key) in
the proposed SQKA protocol, indeed following it faithfully, then it will reduce to a deterministic SQKD
protocol. Specifically, in analogy of ping-pong protocol [6] to perform a quantum direct communication
task, which was also shown to share a quantum key in a deterministic manner.
2.1 Possible attack strategies and security
1. Eve’s attack: As mentioned beforehand Eve’s ignorance regarding the final shared key solely
depends on the fact whether Alice receives Bob’s raw key in a secure manner. In other words,
although Eve is aware of the initial state and Alice’s raw key, she still requires Bob’s key to obtain
the final shared key. In what follows, we will discuss some attacks, she may attempt to extract this
information.
The easiest technique Eve may incorporate is a CNOT attack (as described and attempted in
Refs. [35, 36, 70]). To be specific, she may prepare enough ancilla qubits (initially as |0〉) to
perform a CNOT with each travel qubit at control and an ancilla as a target while Alice to Bob
communication. This way the compound state of Alice’s, Bob’s and Eve’s qubits, prior to Bob’s
measurement, becomes |ψABE〉 = |000〉+|111〉√2 . As Bob returns some of the qubits performing sin-
gle qubit measurement in the computational basis on his qubit (B). The reduced state of Alice’s
and Eve’s qubits may be written as |ρAE〉 = |00〉〈00|+|11〉〈11|2 corresponding to Bob’s measurement,
while the three qubit state remains unchanged for reflected qubits. Suppose Bob prepares a fresh
qubit |ξB〉 = |rB ⊕ KB〉 and returns the string of encoded qubits (in other words, measured
qubits) and reflected qubits to Alice (without applying a permutation operator). Subsequently,
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Eve again performs a CNOT operation while Bob to Alice communication with control on travel
qubits and target on the ancilla qubits. It is straightforward to check that in case of reflected qubits
the state reduces to |ψABE〉 = |00〉+|11〉√2 ⊗ |0〉. Whereas, for encoded qubits it may be written as
|ρ′ABE〉 = 12 (|0〉〈0| ⊗ |KB〉〈KB|+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ |KB ⊕ 1〉〈KB ⊕ 1|)⊗ |KB〉〈KB|. From which it may
be observed that Eve will always obtain Bob’s secret key. However, this problem is circumvented
using a permutation operator (in Step1.2) by Bob on the string of encoded and reflected qubits.
As Eve’s CNOT attack strategy is foiled by the use of a permutation operator she may attempt other
attack strategies. Suppose she performs an intercept and resend attack. Specifically, in this attack,
she can prepare an equal number of Bell states as Alice and send all the second qubits to Bob,
keeping the Alice’s original sequence with herself. Bob follows the protocol and encodes n qubits
randomly and sends them to Alice, which is again intercepted by Eve. Subsequently, Eve performs
the Bell measurement on all the Bell pairs (which she had initially prepared), and she may come to
know which n qubits were measured by Bob. Quantitatively, she can get this knowledge 75% of the
time as in the Bell measurement outcomes anything other than the original state would result in a
measurement performed by Bob. Depending upon the Bell measurement outcomes Bob’s encoding
can also be revealed as |ψ−〉 and |φ±〉 will correspond to Bob’s 0 and 1 in the computational basis,
respectively (see Section 4 and Table 2 for more detail). Subsequently, she performs a measure-
ment in the computational basis on the qubits sent by Alice corresponding to each qubit Bob has
measured. Finally, she sends the new string of qubits (comprising of freshly prepared and Alice’s
original qubits) to Alice which will never fail in eavesdropping checking and Alice will announce
her key and Eve can get at least 75% of the shared key.
It is important to note here that 25% of the key of Alice and Bob will also not match in this case.
This may be attributed to the disturbance caused due to eavesdropping, which left that signature
and is a characteristic nature of quantum communication. This fact can be explored to achieve the
security from this kind of an attack. Specifically, Alice and Bob may choose to perform a verifica-
tion strategy of a small part of the shared key to check this kind of an attempt.
As we have already incorporated a permutation of particles scheme (performed by Bob) for secu-
rity against CNOT attack, it becomes relevant to see the feasibility of this attack in this case as
well. Bob discloses the permutation operator for decoy qubits only after an authenticated acknowl-
edgment by Alice. Therefore, Eve fails to obtain the encoded bit value prior to this disclosure of
Bob as it is, although it’s encoded in the computational basis, but she does not know the partner
Bell pair due to randomization. She will require this Bell pair to decode the information as the
measurement outcome of the partner Bell particle acts as a key for decoding the Bob’s information.
Further, Bob announces the correct order of particles only when less than a threshold of errors are
found during eavesdropping checking.
Indeed, most of the attacks by an eavesdropper can be circumvented if the classical Bob is given
power to permute the string of qubits with him, i.e., Bob can secure his raw key (information) in
the proposed SQKA scheme by permuting the particles before sending to Alice.
There are some other attacks (see [71, 72] for details) which do not affect the security of the pro-
posed protocol, like disturbance attack, denial of service attack, and impersonation attack (as it
becomes void after incorporating an authentication protocol).
2. Alice’s attack: In the eavesdropping checking, at the end of the round trip of Bell pairs, Bob
announces the positions of the reflected qubits in each of the Bell pairs and the remaining string
(i.e., encoded string after measurement) is in the computational basis and Alice can know Bob’s
encoding before she announces her own. In other words, she can control the final key completely as
she can announce her raw key accordingly. However, this is not desired in a genuine key agreement
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scheme.
This possible attack by Alice is circumvented by the use of permutation operator discussed in the
last attack. As Bob reveals the permutation he had applied on the freshly prepared qubits (on
which his raw key is encoded) only after Alice announces her raw key, she can not extract his raw
key due to lack of knowledge of pair particles corresponding to each initially prepared Bell state.
Hence, only after Alice’s announcement of her raw key she comes to know Bob’s raw key with his
cooperation.
To avoid this attack, we may also decide that both Alice and Bob share the hash values of their raw
keys during their communication due to which if she wishes to change her raw key later, then the
protocol is aborted as the hash value for her modified raw key will not match with original raw key.
3. Bob’s attack: As mentioned in the Alice’s attack that Bob announces the permutation operator
only after receiving her raw key. One should notice here that the permuted string Bob has sent
and corresponding Alice’s string are in computational basis. Further, Bob knows each bit value
in Alice’s string as those are nothing but Bob’s corresponding measurement outcomes in Step
1.2. Once Bob knows Alice’s raw key, he may control the final key entirely by disclosing a new
permutation operator that suits his choice of shared key.
Therefore, it becomes important to incorporate the hash function as if Bob has already shared the
hash value of his key he cannot change his raw key during announcement of permutation operator.
3 Controlled direct secure semi-quantum communication
If we observe the SQKA protocol proposed here, it can be stated that Bob sends his raw key by a DSSQC
scheme and Alice announces her raw key. The security of the final key depends on the security of the
raw key of Bob. Hence, a semi-quantum counterpart of direct communication scheme can be designed.
However, avoiding the designing of various schemes for the same task, we rather propose a controlled
version of direct communication scheme and discuss the feasibility of realizing this scheme, which would
directly imply the possibility of direct communication scheme. Here, we will propose two controlled
direct secure semi-quantum communication protocols. Note that in the proposed CDSSQC schemes only
Alice is considered as a classical party, while Bob and Charlie possess quantum powers.
3.1 Protocol 2: Controlled direct secure semi-quantum communication
The working of this scheme is as follows.
Step2.1: Preparation of shared quantum channel: Charlie prepares n + m = N copies of a three
qubit entangled state
|ψ〉GHZ−like = |ψ1〉|a〉+ |ψ2〉|b〉√
2
, (2)
where |ψi〉 ∈
{
|ψ+〉, |ψ−〉, |φ+〉, |φ−〉 : |ψ±〉 = |00〉±|11〉√
2
, |φ±〉 = |01〉±|10〉√
2
,
}
and 〈a|b〉 = δa,b. The
classical user Alice will encode her n-bit message on the n copies, while the remaining m copies
will be used as decoy qubits to check an eavesdropping attempt. Subsequently, Charlie prepares
three sequences of all the first, second and third qubits of the entangled states. Finally, he sends the
first and second sequences to Alice and Bob, respectively.
They can check the correlations in a few of the shared quantum states to avoid an eavesdropping
attempt using intercept and resend attack, i.e., Charlie measures his qubits in {|a〉, |b〉} basis, while
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Alice and Bob in computational basis. However, such an eavesdropping test would fail to provide
security against measurement and resend attack. Security against such an attack is discussed later.
In addition, Charlie and Bob both being capable of performing quantum operations may perform
BB84 subroutine (cf. [65, 72, 73] and references therein) to ensure a secure transmission of the
qubits belonging to quantum channel. This would provide additional security against intercept-
resend attacks on Charlie-Bob quantum channel.
Step2.2: Alice’s encoding: Alice has a n bit message M = {M1A,M2A · · ·M iA · · ·MnA}. To encode this
message Alice measures n qubits (chosen randomly) in computational basis to obtain measure-
ment outcomes rA = {r1A, r2A · · · riA · · · rnA}, and prepares a new string of qubits in {|0〉, |1〉} basis
corresponding to bit values M iA ⊕ riA. Finally, she reinserts all these qubits back into the original
sequence and sends it to Bob only after permuting the string. It is important that she leaves enough
qubits undisturbed so that those qubits may be employed as decoy qubits.
Step2.3: Announcements and eavesdropping checking: After receiving an authenticated acknowl-
edgement of the receipt of all the qubits from Bob, Alice announces which qubits have been en-
coded and which qubits have been left as decoy qubits. She also discloses the permutation operator
applied only on the decoy qubits. Further, to detect eavesdropping, Bob firstly measures the pair
of decoy qubits from Alice’s and Bob’s sequences in the Bell basis and with the help of Charlie’s
corresponding measurement outcome (which reveals the initial Bell state Alice and Bob were shar-
ing) he can calculate the errors. If sufficiently low errors are found they proceed to the next step,
otherwise start afresh.
Step2.4: Decoding the message: To decode the message, Bob can perform a measurement in the com-
putational basis on all the remaining qubits from both the sequences received from Charlie and
Alice. Subsequently, Alice also discloses her permutation on the message encoded (or freshly pre-
pared) qubits in her string. However, Bob cannot decode Alice’s secret message yet, as he remains
unaware of the Bell state he was sharing with Alice until Charlie announces his measurement out-
come.
Step2.5: Charlie’s announcement: Finally, Charlie announces his measurement outcome in {|a〉, |b〉}
basis using which Bob can decode Alice’s message.
3.2 Protocol 3: Controlled direct secure semi-quantum communication based on
cryptographic switch
This controlled communication scheme is based on quantum cryptographic switch scheme proposed
in the past [74] and has been shown to be useful in almost all the controlled communication schemes
[65, 75–77].
Step3.1: Preparation of the shared quantum channel: Charlie prepares n + m = N copies of one
of the Bell states, out of which n Bell pairs will be used for sending messages and the rest as
decoy qubits. Subsequently, Charlie prepares two sequences of all the first and second qubits of
the entangled state. He also performs a permutation operator on the second sequence. Finally, he
sends the first and second sequences to Alice and Bob, respectively.
Both Alice and Bob may check the correlations in a few of the shared Bell states to avoid an
eavesdropping attempt as was done in Step2.1. Similarly, Charlie and Bob both being capable of
performing quantum operations may also perform BB84 subroutine (cf. [65,72,73] and references
therein).
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Step3.2: Same as Step2.2 of Protocol 2.
Step3.3: Announcements and eavesdropping checking: After receiving an authenticated acknowledg-
ment of the receipt of all the qubits from Bob, Alice announces which qubits have been encoded
and which qubits have been left as decoy qubits. She also discloses the permutation operator corre-
sponding to the decoy qubits only. Then Charlie announces the correct positions of the partner pairs
of decoy Bell states in the Bob’s sequence. To detect eavesdropping, Bob measures the pairs of de-
coy qubits from Alice’s and Bob’s sequences in the Bell basis to calculate the errors. If sufficiently
low errors are found they proceed to the next step, otherwise start afresh.
Step3.4: Decoding the message: To decode the message Bob can perform a measurement in the com-
putational basis on all the remaining qubits from both the sequences received from Charlie and
Alice. Meanwhile, Alice discloses her permutation operator enabling Bob to decode her message.
However, he cannot decode Alice’s secret message yet as he is unaware of the permutation operator
Charlie has applied.
Step3.5: Charlie’s announcement: Finally, Charlie sends the information regarding the permutation
operator to Bob, using which Bob can decode Alice’s message.
It is important to note that two of the three parties involved in the CDSSQC protocols are considered
quantum here. The possibilities of minimizing the number of parties required to have quantum resources
will be investigated in the near future.
In the recent past, it has been established that the controlled counterparts of secure direct communi-
cation schemes [75–77] can provide solutions of a handful of real life problems. For instance, schemes
of quantum voting [65, 66] and e-commerce [63] are obtained by modifying the schemes for controlled
DSQC. Here, we present the first semi-quantum e-commerce scheme, in which Alice (buyer) is classi-
cal, and Bob (merchant) and Charlie (online store) possess quantum resources. Both Alice and Bob are
registered users of the online store Charlie. When Alice wishes to buy an item from Bob she sends a
request to Charlie, who prepares a tripartite state (as in Eq. 2 of Protocol 2) to be shared with Alice and
Bob. Alice encodes the information regarding her merchandise to Bob and encodes it as described in
Step2.2. The merchant can decode Alice’s order in Step2.5 but will deliver the order only after receiving
an acknowledgment from Charlie in Step2.5. Here, it is important to note that in some of the recent
schemes, Charlie can obtain information about Alice’s order and/or change it, which is not desired in a
genuine e-commerce scheme [10]. The semi-quantum e-commerce scheme modified from the proposed
CDSSQC scheme is free from such an attack as Alice applies a permutation operator and discloses her
permutation operator only after a successful transmission of all the travel particles. In a similar manner,
another quantum e-commerce scheme may be obtained using CDSSQC scheme presented as Protocol 3,
where the online store prepares only Bell states.
3.3 Possible attack strategies and security
Most of the attacks on the proposed CDSQC schemes may be circumvented in the same manner as is
done in the SQKA scheme in Section 2.1. Here, we only mention additional attack strategies that may be
adopted by Eve.
As discussed while security of SQKA scheme, the easiest technique for Eve would be a CNOT attack.
Specifically, she may entangle her ancilla qubits with the travel qubits from Charlie to Alice and later
disentangle them during Alice to Bob communication. She succeeds in leaving no traces using this attack
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and getting Alice’s all the information (see Section 2.1 for detail). However, Alice may circumvent this
attack just by applying a permutation operator on all the qubits before sending them to Bob.
Eve may choose to perform an intercept and resend attack. Specifically, she can prepare an equal
number of single qubits in the computational basis as Charlie has sent to Alice and send all these qubits
to Alice, keeping the Charlie’s original sequence with herself. When Alice, Bob, and Charlie check the
correlations in Step 1, they will detect uncorrelated string with Alice corresponding to this attack.
Eve can measure the intercepted qubits in the computational basis and prepares corresponding single
qubits to resend to Alice. In this case, Eve will not be detected during correlation checking. However,
Alice transmits the encoded qubits after permutation to Bob due to which Eve fails to decode her message,
and consequently, Eve will be detected at Bob’s port during eavesdropping checking.
As mentioned beforehand both these attacks and the set of remaining attacks may be circumvented
due to permutation operator applied by Alice.
4 Semi-quantum dialogue
In this section, we propose a two-party protocol for SQD, where Alice has all quantum powers and Bob
is classical. The following are the main steps of the protocol.
Step4.1: Alice’s preparation of quantum channel and encoding on it: Alice prepares n + m = N
number of initial Bell states, i.e., |ψ+〉⊗N , where |ψ+〉 = |00〉+|11〉√
2
. She prepares two ordered
sequences of all the first qubits as home (H) qubits and all the second qubits as travel (T) qubits
from the initial Bell states. She keeps the home (H) qubits with herself and sends the string of
travel qubits to classical Bob. The initial Bell states and encoding schemes are publicly known and
let’s say that UA and UB are the measurement operations of Alice and Bob, respectively.
Step4.2: Bob’s eavesdropping checking: Bob informs Alice about the reception of the travel sequence
by a classical channel. Here, we can perform an eavesdroping checking strategy as discussed above
in Step 1.1 of CDSSQC schemes in Section 3 that the joint measurement in the computational basis
by Alice and Bob on the Bell pairs should be correlated. If they find error rate more than a threshold
value, then they abort the protocol and starts from the beginning.
Step4.3: Bob’s encoding: Bob measures n qubits (chosen randomly) in the computational basis and
records all the measurement outcomes in a string of bits rB. Then he prepares a string of his
message in binary as MB. Finally, he prepares fresh qubits in the computational basis for each bit
value rB ⊕MB and reinserts them in the original sequence. Then he sends the encoded and decoy
qubits back to Alice after performing a permutation on them. Here, it is important to note that the
encoding operation used by Bob can be thought equivalent to Pauli operations {I,X} but they are
performed classically by Bob, i.e., remaining within his classical domain.
Step4.4: Alice’s eavesdropping checking: After receiving the authenticated acknowledgement of the
receipt of all the qubits from Alice, Bob announces the positions of decoy qubits along with the
corresponding permutation operator. Alice then measures all the decoy qubits in the Bell basis and
any measurement outcome other than that of the initially prepared Bell state would correspond to
an eavesdropping attempt.
Step4.5: Alice’s encoding and measurement: For sufficiently low errors in eavesdropping checking
Bob also discloses the permutation operator applied on the freshly prepared message qubits and
Alice proceeds to encoding her secret on the qubits received from Bob by applying Pauli operations
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Bob’s message Alice’s message Final Bell state measurement outcome
|0〉 |0〉 |ψ±〉
|0〉 |1〉 |φ±〉
|1〉 |0〉 |φ±〉
|1〉 |1〉 |ψ±〉
Table 2: All possible encoding of Alice and Bob with corresponding Bell measurement outcomes. Here,
|ψ+〉 is assumed to be the initial state.
{I,X}. Finally, she measures the partner pairs in Bell basis and announces her measurement
outcomes. From the measurement outcomes, both Alice and Bob can extract Bob’s and Alice’s
message, respectively.
Here, it should be noted that the Bell measurement performed in Step4.5 is not necessary, a two qubit
measurement performed in the computational basis will also work in the above mentioned case.
In the recent past, it has been established that a scheme for quantum dialogue can be modified to
provide a solution for the quantum private comparison, which can be viewed as a special form of socialist
millionaire problem [16]. In the semi-quantum private comparison (SQPC) task [34], two classical users
wish to compare their secrets of n-bits with the help of an untrusted third party possessing quantum
resources. Before performing the SQPC scheme, the untrusted third party (Alice here) prepares a large
number of copies of the Bell states using which both Bob1 and Bob2 prepare two shared unconditionally
secure symmetric strings in analogy with the schemes described in [41]. They use one symmetric string
as a semi-quantum key, while the other to decide the positions of the qubits they will choose to reflect
or to measure. Specifically, both the classical users decide to measure the ith qubit received during the
SQPC scheme if ith bit in the shared string is 1, otherwise they reflect the qubit. Using this approach
both classical users prepare fresh qubit using the encoding operation defined in Step4.3, with the only
difference that this time the transmitted information is encrypted by the shared key. Once Alice receives
all the qubits and measures all of them in the Bell basis. Both the classical users disclose the string
they had originally shared, using which Alice announces the measurement outcomes corresponding to
the reflected qubits. Bobis can subsequently compute the error rate from the measurement outcomes and
if the error rate is below the threshold, Alice publicly announces 1-bit secret whether both the users had
the same amount of assets or not (see [34] for detail). Thus, we establish that a slight modification of
Protocol 4 may lead to a new scheme for SQPC. This is interesting as to the best of our knowledge until
now there exist only two proposals for SQPC [34, 56].
4.1 Possible attack strategies and security
Most of the attacks on the proposed SQKA and CDSSQC schemes will also be valid on the SQD scheme.
Further, as mentioned beforehand most of these attacks will be circumvented due to permutation operator
Bob has applied. Here, it is worth mentioning that permutation operator is not a unique way to circumvent
these attacks, a prior shared key will also ensure the security of the protocol. A similar strategy of using a
prior shared key has been observed in a few protocols in the past [27]. We would like to emphasize here
that employing a key for security is beyond the domain of direct communication. Therefore, we have
preferred permutation of particles over a key in all the proposed schemes.
Further, it is shown in the past by some of the present authors [71,72] that if the information regarding
the initial state is not a public knowledge and sent using a QSDC/DSQC protocol, then an inherent
possible attack in QD schemes, i.e., information leakage attack, can be circumvented.
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5 Efficiency analysis
Performance of a quantum communication protocol can be characterized using qubit efficiency [78],
η = c
q+b
, which is the ratio of c-bits of message transmitted using q number of qubits and b-bits of classical
communication. Note that the qubits involved in eavesdropping checking as decoy qubits are counted
while calculating qubit efficiency, but the classical communication associated with it is not considered.
Before computing the qubit efficiency of the four protocols proposed here, we would like to note
that in all the protocols the classical senders are sending n bits of secret, while in Protocol 4 (protocol
for SQD, where both classical and quantum users transmit information), the quantum user Alice was
also able to send the same amount of information to classical Bob. In all these cases, the classical
sender encodes n bits secret information using n-qubits. However, to ensure the secure transmission
of those n-qubits, another 3n-qubits are utilized (i.e., m = 3n). This is so because to ensure a secure
communication of n qubits, an equal number of decoy qubits are required to be inserted randomly [79].
The error rate calculated on the decoy qubits decides, whether to proceed with the protocol or discard. In
a semi-quantum scheme, a classical users cannot produce decoy qubits, so to securely transmit n-bit of
classical information, he/she must receive 2n qubits from the quantum user, who would require to send
these 2n-qubits to be used by user along with another 2n qubits, which are decoy qubits for the quantum
user- classical user transmission. Thus, quantum user need to prepare and send 4n qubits to a classical
user for sending n bits of classical communication.
Protocol Task c (bits) qc (qubits) d (qubits) q = qc + d (qubits) b (bits) Qubit
efficiency
η = c
q+b
Protocol 1 SQKA n 2n 3n 5n 5n η = 10%
Protocol 2 CDSSQC n 4n 13n 17n 8n η = 4%
Protocol 3 CDSSQC n 3n 10n 13n 8n η = 4.72%
Protocol 4 SQD 2n 2n 3n 5n 5n η = 20%
Table 3: The qubit efficiency of proposed semi-quantum protocols.
The details of the number of qubits used for both sending the message (qc) and checking an eaves-
dropping attempt (d) in all the protocols proposed here are explicitly mentioned in Table 3. In the last
column of the table the computed qubit efficiencies are listed. From Table 3, one can easily observe that
the qubit efficiency of three party schemes (Protocol 2 and 3) is less than that of two party schemes (Pro-
tocol 1 and 4). This can be attributed to the nature of three party schemes, where one party is supervising
the one-way semi-quantum communication among two remaining parties, which increases the resource
requirements to ensure the control power. In the controlled semi-quantum schemes, the qubit efficiency
computed for Protocol 3 is comparatively more than Protocol 2 as the controller had chosen to prepare
a bipartite entangled state instead of tripartite entangled state used in Protocol 2. This fact is consistent
with some of our recent observations [65]. Among the two party protocols, Protocol 4 has a higher qubit
efficiency than that of Protocol 1 as the quantum communication involved in this case is two-way.
Further, one may compare the calculated qubit efficiency with that of the set of protocols designed
for the same task with all the parties possessing quantum resources. Such a comparison reveals that the
requirement of unconditional security leads to decrease in the qubit efficiency for the schemes that are
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performed with one or more classical user(s) (for example, the qubit efficiency of a QKA scheme was
14.29% which is greater than 10% qubit efficiency obtained here for the SQKA protocol).
6 Conclusion
A set of schemes are proposed for various quantum communication tasks involving one or more user(s)
possessing restricted quantum resources. To be specific, a protocol for key agreement between a classical
and a quantum party is proposed in which both parties equally contribute in determining the final key
and no one can control that key. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt to design a key
agreement between classical and quantum parties. We have also proposed two novel schemes for con-
trolled communication from a classical sender and a quantum receiver. It is important to note here that
the proposed schemes are not only the first schemes of their kind, i.e., semi-quantum in nature, are also
shown to be useful in designing a semi-quantum e-commerce schemes that can provide unconditional
security to a classical buyer. The presented semi-quantum e-commerce schemes are relevant as the buyer
is supposed to possess minimum quantum resources, while the online store (the controller) and the mer-
chant may be equipped with quantum resources. This kind of a semi-quantum scheme can be used as a
solution to a real life problem as in daily life, end users are expected to be classical. The present work
is also the first attempt for designing semi-quantum schemes having direct real life application. Further,
the first and an unconditionally secure scheme for dialogue among a classical and a quantum users is
proposed here. Later it has also been shown that the proposed SQD scheme can be modified to obtain a
solution for private comparison or socialist millionaire problem. The security of the proposed schemes
against various possible attack strategies are also established.
The possibility of realizing semi-quantum schemes for these tasks establishes that the applicability of
the idea of semi-quantum schemes is not restricted to key distribution and direct communication between
a classical and quantum or two classical (only with the help of a third quantum party) parties. Our
present work not only shows that almost all the secure communication tasks that can be performed by two
quantum parties can also be performed in a semi-quantum manner at the cost of increased requirement of
the quantum resources to be used by the quantum party. To establish this point, the qubit efficiencies of
the proposed schemes are computed, which are evidently lower than the efficiency of the similar schemes
with all the parties possessing quantum resources.
With the recent development of experimental facilities and a set of recent experimental realizations of
some quantum cryptographic schemes, we hope that the present results will be experimentally realized
in the near future and these schemes or their variants will be used in the devices to be designed for the
daily life applications.
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